The discussion on accountability in nonprofit organizations and elsewhere has tended to be heavily normative. This is not surprising, since a key purpose of the accountability policy discourse is to promote behaviors that are socially or legally legitimated and to prevent those that are not. However, is it not possible that policy debates on accountability conflate its normative claims with its actual effects? In other words, is there a rift between how accountability is imagined and how it actually operates? As the authors of a background paper for a United Nations Human Development Report put it, "Accountability is often derided as a cure-all development buzzword: a fit subject for exhortation, but something that in most parts of the world is rarely achieved because it demands too much compassion of the powerful and too much undiluted civic virtue from ordinary citizens."
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I would like to propose in this short essay that a focus on normative logics of accountability, while important, can mask the realities of social structure and the relations of power that underlie them. A turn to more grounded empirical work that examines how accountability systems and regimes operate might offer new perspectives and, more importantly, new ways of practicing accountability.
Three Streams of Normative Logic in Nonprofit Accountability
In the standard normative logic, the problem of accountability is frequently cast in technocratic terms; it is a problem of poor oversight or inadequate representation, amenable to correction through stringent regulation, enhanced regimes for disclosure, monitoring, and enforcement, and more representative electoral and decision making processes (in the case of democratic organizations and systems). A veritable slew of definitions emerge from attempts to frame accountability in these terms, such as "the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions" 4 , or "the capacity to demand someone engage in reason-giving to justify her behavior, and/or the capacity to impose a penalty for poor performance. The second normative stream centers on performance-based reporting, built on the assumption that organizations should be held to account for what they deliver. The mechanisms of accountability thus seek to measure performance, aiming to quantify or narrate it in annual reports, project reports, logical frameworks, and so on. The purpose of such accountability is to demonstrate "results." A common complaint about such accountability mechanisms is that they often reflect the interests of funders or donors, in that the metrics tend to be easily quantifiable and designed to be more useful to donors as part of their annual budget cycles (in showing that they have funded "success") than they are of use to nonprofit managers for purposes of strategic decision making.
A third and more emergent normative stream of logic seeks to rein in opportunism by focusing on the expressed raison d'etre of a nonprofit organization: its mission. If nonprofits exist for purposes of public good, why not ask them to demonstrate progress towards achieving that mission? Doing so would require clearer specification of metrics related to mission, and better 7 The elision of "governance" with "board," which is quite common in American, Canadian What does such an approach imply, in practical terms, for studying the nonprofit sector? Again, the presentations by Nancy Rosenblum and Robert Goodin at the previous Hauser Center conference offer some ways forward.
• First, there is a need for empirical work on the broader political and structural context in which accountability demands are made (i.e., the accountability "regime"). While
Rosenblum noted that nonprofits are often poor at measuring performance and resultsthey frequently have ambiguous goals, they do not regularly perform evaluations, and they do not seem to think that information is necessary for accomplishing objectivesshe also observed that it "does not appear that donors . . . or funders provide [the] incentives" for better accountability. In particular, she cautioned that the funding environment creates a "ceaseless preoccupation with money" among nonprofit leaders, and that there is "[n]othing more important than understand[ing] the politics of foundations, of granting agencies." The pressures emerging from the three normative logics noted above (of governance, performance, and mission) may make more sense when grounded within the realities of this structural context.
• Second, and relatedly, there is a need for evaluation of accountability regimes. What have been the effects of more stringent reporting and disclosure requirements (by funders or regulators) on nonprofits? Have efforts in self regulation (such as certification standards by nonprofit associations) led to improved governance or performance? In other words, has the accountability revolution actually led to better accountability, and according to whom?
• Third, there is a need to understand better how nonprofit networks might constitute an alternative or complement to regulatory power. Goodin has suggested that "networkbased accountability" could be a distinctive guarantor of accountability among nonprofits (as compared to the public and private sectors), operating through "monitoring and reputational sanctioning" among a group of actors that share a common set of social concerns. 12 Rosenblum is more skeptical, arguing that networks do not constitute an accountability regime, since a network does not involve regulatory power "with capacity to set standards, monitor and enforce." There is, however, some empirical evidence that networks can have teeth, but the conditions under which this is possible remain to be further elaborated. 13 Again, there is a need for further empirical work rather than normative prescription.
For observers of accountability, this discussion can be summarized as pointing to two general sets of analytical assumptions. As indicated above, accountability discourses are frequently framed as a technocratic or administrative issue where problems are relatively identifiable, e.g., mismanagement of financial resources for personal gain, fraud, and other forms of malfeasance.
The solutions that follow from this form of problem framing tend to be fairly straightforward, decides what metrics are important, who collects the data, who interprets it, and who decides how to use it.
This approach to accountability -in which accountability is seen as a social construct to be examined through better empirical analysis -implies that instruments of accountability are at least as likely to reproduce relationships of inequality as they are to overturn them. This may be the case regardless of whether one makes the normative choice of focusing on board-level governance, performance measurement, or mission, for solving (and framing) the ills of accountability. At the very least, it suggests that the reality of accountability is ambiguous -as a socially embedded, politicized, and value-heavy construction.
